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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Larry Lee James Stadtmiller was charged with one count of felony sexual abuse
of a minor child under sixteen years of age.

Pursuant to an oral plea agreement,

Mr. Stadtmiller attempted to enter a guilty plea to an amended charge of felony injury to
a child, but the district court rejected that first attempted Alford plea. 1

He then

attempted again to plead guilty to the amended charge as part of a written plea
agreement, but the district court again refused to accept his Alford plea.

At the

conclusion of Mr. Stadtmiller's subsequent jury trial, the jury found him guilty of the
original charge of sexual abuse of a minor child. The district court imposed a unified
sentence of nine years, with three years fixed.
Mr. Stadtmiller appealed, asserting that the district court abused its discretion
when it rejected his first attempted Alford plea, and when it imposed his sentence.
(App. Br., pp.6-18.)
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that, although Mr. Stadtmiller's denial
of guilt did not legally preclude his Alford plea, the error is harmless because the record
shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that without it, the district court would have
exercised its discretion by rejecting his Alford plea.

(Resp. Br., pp.5-13.) The State

also argued that Mr. Stadtmiller did not establish that his sentence is excessive. (Resp.
Br., pp.13-18.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's harmless error argument.
Contrary to the State's contention, the district court's error in not acting consistently with

1

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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the legal standards applicable to accepting an Alford plea when it rejected
Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted Alford plea is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the district
court's error in not acting consistently with the applicable legal standards did not
contribute to the district court's rejection of the first attempted Alford plea. Thus, the
district court committed reversible error, and Mr. Stadtmiller's judgment of conviction
should be vacated and his case should be remanded for the district court to reconsider
his Alford plea.
While Mr. Stadtmiller also challenges the State's argument that he did not
establish that his sentence is excessive, he relies on the arguments presented in the
Appellant's Brief and will not repeat those arguments herein.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Stadtmiller's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first
attempted Alford plea?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's First
Attempted Alford Plea
Mr. Stadtmiller asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it rejected
his first attempted Alford plea, because the district court did not act consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the decision of whether to accept an Alford plea. (App.
Br., pp.6-14.)

"[A]s long as there is a strong factual basis for the plea, and the

defendant understands the charges against him, a voluntary plea of guilty may be
accepted by the court despite a continuing claim by the defendant that he is innocent."
Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 61 (1981) (citing Alford, 400 U.S. 25). Further, "there is

a substantial body of Idaho case law demonstrating that Alford pleas may rightfully be
accepted in situations where the defendant asserts factual innocence."
State, 148 Idaho 622, 629 n.4 (2010).

Schoger v.

The district court, by determining that it

categorically could not accept an Alford plea where the defendant does not admit any
guilt or was not too intoxicated to remember the incident at issue, did not act
consistently with the legal standards applicable to accepting an Alford plea.
In the Respondent's Brief, the State appears to agree that the district court did
not act consistently with the applicable legal standards. "The district court's comments
that, in order to qualify as an Alford plea, [Mr.] Stadtmiller had to either admit his
criminal act ... or assert he could not recall his criminal conduct, [are] inconsistent with
the standard set forth in Schoger." (Resp. Br., pp.7-8.) The State also writes, "In light
of the district court's various statements that it did not have discretion to accept
[Mr.] Stadtmiller's Alford plea unless he either admitted guilt or claimed he could not
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recall the criminal incident, the court appears to have employed an incorrect standard of
law." (Resp. Br., p.8.)
However, the State also argues that, "Because the record shows that, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the district court would have rejected [Mr.] Stadtmiller's Alford plea
under the correct legal standard, the error was harmless." (Resp. Br., p.8.) According
to the State, the district court rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's second plea agreement
"because he continued to deny his criminal conduct and, accordingly, would not be able
to comply with the counseling requirements of probation." (Resp. Br., pp.9-10 (footnote
omitted).)

"By the same token," the oral plea agreement accompanying the first

attempted Alford plea "required both parties to recommend probation and counseling
(as recommended by the psychosexual evaluator), and it appears that probation and
counseling were considered certainties." (Resp. Br., p.10.) Thus, the State argues that,
"Even if the court had recognized it had discretion to accept [Mr.] Stadtmiller's [first]
Alford plea without an admission of guilt, it would have rejected such a plea based on its

general discretionary decision to not accept pleas of guilt unless the defendant actually
admits guilt and can succeed on probation."2 (Resp. Br., p.10.) Contrary to the State's
argument, the district court's error in not acting consistently with the legal standards

Mr. Stadtmiller would again note that the applicable legal standards do not require a
district court to accept an Alford plea where the defendant does not admit any guilt.
(See App. Br., p.13 n.3.) In Schoger, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "no provision
of Idaho law ... requires a court to accept a guilty plea." Schoger, 148 Idaho at 630.
Schoger is distinguishable from the present case because the district court in Schoger
determined that it would not accept the defendant's Alford plea after applying the
applicable legal standards to the particular circumstances in that case, see id. at 62830, while the district court here determined that it categorically could not accept
Mr. Stadtmiller's Alford plea.
2
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applicable to accepting an Alford plea when it rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted
Alford plea is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "In Idaho, the harmless error test
established in [Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18 (1967)] is now applied to all
objected-to-error." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010). Pursuant to Chapman,
once a defendant establishes that an objected-to error occurred, "the State shall have
the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
at 222.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently held that "[tJo meet that burden," in the
context of a case involving the question of whether the improper admission of evidence
during a jury trial was harmless error, "the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." State v. Joy, 155
Idaho 1, __ , 304 P.3d 276, 286 (2013). "To say that an error did not 'contribute' to
the ensuing verdict is not, of course, to say that the jury was totally unaware of that
feature of the trial later held to have been erroneous." Id., 304 P.3d at 286 (quoting
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991 )). "To say that an error did not contribute to the

verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury
considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record." Id., 304 P.3d at 286
(quoting Yates, 500 U.S. at 403). 'Thus, an appellate court's inquiry 'is not whether, in
a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered,
but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to
the error."

Id., 304 P.3d at 286 (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279

(1993)) (emphasis in original).
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Mr. Stadtmiller submits that, because the harmless error test established in
Chapman applies to all objected-to-error in Idaho, Perry, 150 Idaho at 211, the State in

this case should be held to the same burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the error is harmless as to which it was held in Joy. Thus, the State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the district court's
rejection of Mr. Stadtmiller's first attempted Alford plea. See Joy, 155 Idaho at __ ,
304 P.3d at 286.
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Stadtmiller would note that the State has
misapprehended the Chapman harmless error test. The State argues that, "Because
the record shows that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court would have
rejected [Mr.] Stadtmiller's Alford plea under the correct legal standard, the error was
harmless." (Resp. Br., p.8.) However, the Idaho Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court have already rejected such a construction of the Chapman harmless
error test.

As the Idaho Supreme Court indicated in Joy, the standard here is not

whether, in a proceeding that occurred without the error, a rejection of the first
attempted Alford plea "would surely have been rendered." See Joy, 155 Idaho at __ ,
304 P.3d at 286 (quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The actual standard is whether the rejection of the first attempted Alford plea actually
rendered in this case "was surely unattributable to the error." See id., 304 P.3d at 286
(quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the correct standard from the Chapman harmless error test, the State has
not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error in
not acting consistently with the applicable legal standards did not contribute to the
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district court's rejection of the first attempted Alford plea. The State's harmless error
argument relies upon the district court's later refusal of the written plea agreement.
(See Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) However, the district court's subsequent refusal of the written

plea agreement does not establish that the district court would have rejected the earlier
first attempted Alford plea without the error, because the district court refused the
written plea agreement using the same incorrect legal standard that it used when it
rejected the first attempted Alford plea. As its first reason for refusing the written plea
agreement, the district court stated, "I can't accept a plea if a person doesn't think they
did something criminal." (Tr., p.37, Ls.2-9.) Much like the district court's comments
about why it rejected the first attempted Alford plea (Tr., p.30, Ls.11-24), this remark
reflects that, in the words of the State, the district court was still operating under a
standard "inconsistent with the standard set forth in Schoger." (See Resp. Br., pp.7-8.)
Although the district court stated that its second reason for refusing the written
plea agreement was that probation was not viable because Mr. Stadtmiller had not
admitted to any wrongdoing as would be required to start or complete counseling
(Tr., p.37, L.17 - p.38, L.2), this does not prove that the error complained of here is
harmless. As discussed above, the district court's first reason shows that the district
court, when it refused the written plea agreement, was still operating under the incorrect
legal standard that it categorically could not accept Mr. Stadtmiller's plea because he
did not admit any guilt.

(See Tr., p.37, Ls.2-19.)

Further, when the district court

mentioned its second reason for refusing the written plea agreement, it did so only after
mentioning its first reason.

(See Tr., p.37, L.2 - p.38, L.2.)

Rather than being the

district court's sole rationale, the second reason merely worked in tandem with the first
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reason-the incorrect legal standard-when the district court refused the written plea
agreement. Put otherwise, the incorrect legal standard contributed to the district court's
refusal of the written plea agreement. See Joy, 155 Idaho at __ , 304 P.2d at 286.
Because the State's harmless error argument relies upon the district court's later
refusal of the written plea agreement (see Resp. Br., pp.9-10), and because the
incorrect legal standard contributed to the district court's refusal of the written plea
agreement, the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's
error did not contribute to the rejection of the first attempted Alford plea. See Joy, 155
Idaho at __ , 304 P.2d at 286. It cannot be said that the rejection of the first attempted
Alford plea was "surely unattributable to the error." See id., 304 P.2d at 286-87. Thus,

the State has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the district
court's error in not acting consistently with the applicable legal standards did not
contribute to the district court's rejection of the first attempted Alford plea.
The district court abused its discretion when it rejected Mr. Stadtmiller's first
attempted plea agreement, because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standard. The State has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the district court's error is harmless.

The district court's error is reversible, and

Mr. Stadtmiller's judgment of conviction should be vacated and his case should be
remanded for the district court to reconsider his Alford plea.
Alternatively, as the State argues in the event that this Court concludes the error
is reversible (Resp. Br., pp.11-13), Mr. Stadtmiller's case should be remanded to the
district court for a determination,

using its discretion,

Mr. Stadtmiller's Alford plea. See Lafler v. Cooper, _
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of whether to accept

U.S. __ , 132 S. Ct. 1376,

1391 (2012); United States v. Rashad, 396 F.3d 398, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

In this

alternative scenario, this Court would not vacate the judgment of conviction before
remanding Mr. Stadtmiller's case, and the district court on remand would determine
whether to vacate the conviction and accept the plea, or leave the conviction and
sentence in place. See Lafler,

U.S. at __ , 132 S. Ct. at 1389. As the United

States Supreme Court stated in Lafler, the proper remedy in this type of situation "may
be to require the prosecution to reoffer the plea proposal . . . . [T]he judge can then
exercise discretion in deciding whether to vacate the conviction from trial and accept the
plea or leave the conviction undisturbed." See id., 132 S. Ct. at 1389.

Mr. Stadtmiller

would emphasize that, if the district court accepted the Alford plea on remand in this
alternative scenario, it would have discretion to resentence Mr. Stadtmiller based on the
plea and not on the conviction at trial. See id., 132 S. Ct. at 1389.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Stadtmiller respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand his case for the district court to reconsider his Alford plea, or,
alternatively, that this Court remand his case for the district court to determine, using its
discretion, whether to accept his Alford plea. Alternatively, Mr. Stadtmiller respectfully
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand his
case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 20th day of December, 2013.

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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